The first sightings of a G-Phone surfaced shortly after Google acquired Android (a mobile software company) in 2005. Google further acquired Reqwireless and Skia – two small but highly regarded wireless technology shops – and the patent applications and rumors intensified. However, Google has maintained an effective cordon sanitaire around the project allowing nothing of substance to leak to the press –leaving the field wide open to speculation. In the meantime, software downloads of Google Search, News, Maps, YouTube, and GOOG-411 have appeared for many devices including the Blackberry, Windows Mobile devices, iPhones, Palm OS devices - check out the following website for downloads: http://www.google.com/mobile/
The real problem for Google is not the PDAs and high-end devices – it is the regular handsets that could potentially do much more. Current options for an internet-capable Verizon phone are limited to Mobile Web 2.0. Technically, it is possible to get through to the web with Verizon's Mobile Web 2.0, albeit at the expense of user experience.
The problem for Verizon is not Google or the G-Phone, it's AT&T Wireless and the Apple iPhone, because of it’s DOS-era menu. It's widely perceived that if Verizon doesn't do a deal with Google soon, it's going to get its wireless clock cleaned by AT&T and Apple. But Verizon has always been the toughest nut to crack in the twilight zone of US wireless policy. Often perceived as a fiercely xenophobic and cautious operator, Verizon is notorious for the glacial pace of its product development process. This is despite the fact that the vast majority of the development work is done outside by the handset manufacturers and external developers. Verizon's internal barriers to innovation, largely raised under the flag of network integrity, quality and security – a legacy of its wireline history – are very high hurdles for any new service or innovation improvement to surmount.
If Verizon does do a deal with Google, the latter would almost certainly push the operator towards open standards, tapping into the vast eco-system of third party developers of games and applications. Verizon would also stand to make a lot of money. It is no secret that the mobile data market is enormous, there can be little doubt of this now because the potential has already been demonstrated by the more progressive wireless players overseas. The sad fact is that most of the U.S. wireless industry's overly-cautious approach to data service development has probably cost it billions of dollars in lost opportunities already, with only AT&T Wireless so far seeming to have received its wake-up call.
Google will finally have pried open the most closed of operating systems – a task that even the FCC found daunting – and drag US mobile consumer services at least into the 1990s. For Verizon, as well as making it a lot of money, it will stanch the current flow (which otherwise threatens to become a flood) of subscribers to AT&T Wireless. In the process, Verizon Wireless may actually get its mojo back and learn a few tricks that can help it in the wireline space.
The mystery surrounding Google's intentions deepened when the FCC released details of the upcoming 700 MHz spectrum auctions in August 2007. Despite having no background in the industry and never having bid in a national spectrum auction before, Google made a pledge that it would bid $4.6 billion when the time came – in January 2008. Google did this specifically to get the current wireless players off the dime. Google actually read the fine print in the rules and realized that a bid of $4.6 billion would trigger a provision to make part of the new spectrum "open access" like it is almost everywhere else in the world. Open access in its simplest terms means that consumers can buy any compatible phone, not necessarily from the carrier like they have to in the US today, and expect it to work on the system. Users can also choose to load whatever applications and services they like – as happens today in the UK.
In terms of opening access to the new spectrum, Google has already succeeded – the provision was triggered and the rules have been changed. Although both AT&T Wireless and Verizon signaled that they didn't really care, Verizon subsequently challenged the FCC on this point in the courts – and lost. This is probably another factor in Verizon's final acceptance of reality and may have been the final trigger in accepting Google's overtures.
Google would rather not bid on the spectrum when it comes to the crunch for $4.6 billion for three reasons: (a) the earliest services could be established on the new spectrum is 2010, and it would likely take years to move customers over; (b) the build-out would be at least another $3 billion in capex, and this would be expensive even with a partner to share the load, and (c) the margins on the wireless voice business are much lower than on the Internet and would likely dilute Google's overall future margins. Far better would be to use the threat of a bid to force the existing players to accept reality – and here again Google has out-thought its opposition.
Jeff Lindsey, Sanford Bernstein, November 2007
The real problem for Google is not the PDAs and high-end devices – it is the regular handsets that could potentially do much more. Current options for an internet-capable Verizon phone are limited to Mobile Web 2.0. Technically, it is possible to get through to the web with Verizon's Mobile Web 2.0, albeit at the expense of user experience.
The problem for Verizon is not Google or the G-Phone, it's AT&T Wireless and the Apple iPhone, because of it’s DOS-era menu. It's widely perceived that if Verizon doesn't do a deal with Google soon, it's going to get its wireless clock cleaned by AT&T and Apple. But Verizon has always been the toughest nut to crack in the twilight zone of US wireless policy. Often perceived as a fiercely xenophobic and cautious operator, Verizon is notorious for the glacial pace of its product development process. This is despite the fact that the vast majority of the development work is done outside by the handset manufacturers and external developers. Verizon's internal barriers to innovation, largely raised under the flag of network integrity, quality and security – a legacy of its wireline history – are very high hurdles for any new service or innovation improvement to surmount.
If Verizon does do a deal with Google, the latter would almost certainly push the operator towards open standards, tapping into the vast eco-system of third party developers of games and applications. Verizon would also stand to make a lot of money. It is no secret that the mobile data market is enormous, there can be little doubt of this now because the potential has already been demonstrated by the more progressive wireless players overseas. The sad fact is that most of the U.S. wireless industry's overly-cautious approach to data service development has probably cost it billions of dollars in lost opportunities already, with only AT&T Wireless so far seeming to have received its wake-up call.
Google will finally have pried open the most closed of operating systems – a task that even the FCC found daunting – and drag US mobile consumer services at least into the 1990s. For Verizon, as well as making it a lot of money, it will stanch the current flow (which otherwise threatens to become a flood) of subscribers to AT&T Wireless. In the process, Verizon Wireless may actually get its mojo back and learn a few tricks that can help it in the wireline space.
The mystery surrounding Google's intentions deepened when the FCC released details of the upcoming 700 MHz spectrum auctions in August 2007. Despite having no background in the industry and never having bid in a national spectrum auction before, Google made a pledge that it would bid $4.6 billion when the time came – in January 2008. Google did this specifically to get the current wireless players off the dime. Google actually read the fine print in the rules and realized that a bid of $4.6 billion would trigger a provision to make part of the new spectrum "open access" like it is almost everywhere else in the world. Open access in its simplest terms means that consumers can buy any compatible phone, not necessarily from the carrier like they have to in the US today, and expect it to work on the system. Users can also choose to load whatever applications and services they like – as happens today in the UK.
In terms of opening access to the new spectrum, Google has already succeeded – the provision was triggered and the rules have been changed. Although both AT&T Wireless and Verizon signaled that they didn't really care, Verizon subsequently challenged the FCC on this point in the courts – and lost. This is probably another factor in Verizon's final acceptance of reality and may have been the final trigger in accepting Google's overtures.
Google would rather not bid on the spectrum when it comes to the crunch for $4.6 billion for three reasons: (a) the earliest services could be established on the new spectrum is 2010, and it would likely take years to move customers over; (b) the build-out would be at least another $3 billion in capex, and this would be expensive even with a partner to share the load, and (c) the margins on the wireless voice business are much lower than on the Internet and would likely dilute Google's overall future margins. Far better would be to use the threat of a bid to force the existing players to accept reality – and here again Google has out-thought its opposition.
Jeff Lindsey, Sanford Bernstein, November 2007
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